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INTRODUCTION
Implementing the rigorous governance and ownership standards
established in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act' ("Dodd-Frank Act") for derivatives clearing
organizations ("DCOs") will promote free and open access to clearing,
and reduce systemic risk within what is now the $700 trillion worldwide
notional value derivatives market.2 These statutory standards are central
to, and advance the key regulatory tenants of Dodd-Frank: i.e., to restore
transparency, capital adequacy, and accountability to what was the
previously unregulated over-the-counter ("OTC") derivatives market, by
ensuring that swaps are cleared through financially sound DCOs. Also,
these rules will promote competition by curtailing the world's large
swap dealers' ("SDs") continued control over these markets to the
disadvantage of swaps users and smaller dealers wishing to compete on
a level playing field.
This article focuses on the importance of swaps clearing to Dodd-
Frank-mandated market reforms and the need for fair and open access to
that clearing. Specifically, it shows that implementing objective
governance standards for DCOs that include maximum capital
requirements for DCO membership will enhance market stability,
efficiency, and competitiveness. To this end, the article focuses on
clearing-as opposed to the related designated contract markets
("DCMs") or swaps execution facilities ("SEFs")-as clearing lies at the
1. Dodd-Frank Act Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
2. Katy Burne, Complex Financial Bets Rise Ahead of Overhaul, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 16, 2011, at C4, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB 10001424052970204190504577040372556074142.html.
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heart of these Dodd-Frank market reforms.' Also, although the article
discusses the Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC") proposed
rules on DCO governance and ownership in passing, it focuses on the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission's ("CFTC") rulemaking for
DCOs since the CFTC has jurisdiction over 88% of the swaps market.'
The article is divided into four parts. First, it shows that Congress
intended the CFTC to adopt rigorous rules regarding DCO governance
and ownership that eliminate the conflicts of interest that has allowed
SDs to stifle competition for clearing services and to charge
unnecessarily high transaction fees to users of swaps. Second, it
explains how pre-Dodd-Frank market forces have limited access to
clearing services. Third, it demonstrates that the CFTC's final rule on
participant eligibility'-particularly the $50 million threshold for DCO
membership-promises to both improve swap users' access to clearing
and ensure greater stability within the derivatives clearing market.
Finally, the article suggests that the CFTC should strengthen its
proposed governance standards for DCOs, in order to safeguard swap
users' access to clearing against the possibility that the CFTC's
participant eligibility requirements fail to increase DCO membership.'
3. See Letter from Sen. Christopher Dodd, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Banking,
Hous., and Urban Affairs, and Sen. Blanche Lincoln, Chairman, Senate Comm. on
Agric., Nutrition and Forestry, to Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman, Fin. Servs. Comm.,
and Rep. Colin Peterson, Chairman, Comm. on Agric. (June 30, 2010), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2011 /August/20110826/R-1415/R-1415
082411_87659_389488835477_1.pdf ("Congress determined that clearing is at the
heart of reform bringing transactions and counterparties into a robust, conservative and
transparent risk management framework.").
4. Correspondence by Chris Young, Dir. of U.S. Public Policy, Int'l Swaps and
Derivatives Ass'n (noting that although the CFTC and SEC have yet to finalize the
definition of "swap" and "security-based swap," the CFTC will likely have jurisdiction
over "[w]ell over 8 0%" of the derivatives market and probably close to 8 5 % of the
market) (on file with author).
5. See Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles,
76 Fed. Reg. 69,334 (Nov. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Core Principles].
6. See Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract
Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of
Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,732 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Proposed Rules].
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1. DODD-FRANK REQUIRES ALL SWAPS USERS To HAVE FREE AND
OPEN ACCESS TO CLEARING
Dodd-Frank's almost universal mandatory clearing requirement"
for standardized swaps necessitates that swaps users have "fair and open
access"'8 to DCOs as well as to SEFs and DCMs. SEFs and DCMs
enable price discovery by posting the price and volume of exchange-
traded swap transactions.9 The public information generated by SETs
and DCMs ensures price transparency, which in turn promotes market
liquidity by allowing swaps dealers to compete for business based on
publicly available data."o DCOs manage (and mitigate) systemic risk by
guaranteeing the credit worthiness of swap counterparties, and requiring
counterparties to set aside adequate collateral-i.e., margin-to prevent
default." In this respect, DCOs eliminate the interconnectedness
7. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 723, 124 Stat. 1376, 1675-76
(2010) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in a swap unless that person
submits such swap for clearing to a derivatives clearing organization . . . ."). See also
id. § 763, 124 Stat. at 1762 (establishing parallel requirements for security-based
swaps); S. REP. No. 111-176, at 32-35 (2010), available athttp:/ww.gpo.gov/fdsys!
pkg/CRPT-111srptl76/pdf CRPT-111srptl76.pdf (noting that draft provisions
concerning OTC derivatives were designed to minimize non-cleared, off-exchange
trades).
8. Dodd-Frank Act § 725(c), 124 Stat. at 1688. See id § 723(a), 124 Stat. at 1676
("The rules of a derivatives clearing organization . . . shall . . . provide for non-
discriminatory clearing of a swap . . . ."); CFTC & SEC, PUBLIC ROUNDTABLE ON
GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE CLEARING AND LISTING OF SWAPS 33
(Aug. 20, 2010) [hereinafter ROUNDTABLE TRANSCRIPT], available at
http://'lwww.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/documents/dfsubmission/
dfsubmission9_082010.pdf ("[T]he law is clear: Open access is the fundamental
principle.") (statement of Randy Kroszner).
9. See Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,736.
10. See S. REP. No. 111-176, at 29 35 (stating that the clearing of exchange-traded
swaps will "provide . . . derivatives users with more price transparency and liquidity,
and regulators with more information about the risks in the system"); see also BANK
FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, COMM. ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS, MARKET
STRUCTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CLEARING INDUSTRY: IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL
STABILITY 57 (Nov. 2010), available at htip:/xxwww.bis.org/publ/cpss92.pdf.
11. See RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41715, CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST IN DERIVATIVES CLEARING 1 (2011) ("Clearing is an institutional arrangement
that helps protect against counterparty default. A DCO, or clearinghouse, clears and
settles derivatives contracts between counterparties."); BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
supra note 10, at 57 ("Central clearing generally reduces systemic risk and therefore
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between financial institutions that contributed to the 2008 financial
crisis that was precipitated by cascading counterparty risk emanating
from the bankruptcy or need to rescue the likes of Bear Stearns, Lehman
Brothers, and AIG.12
Given the importance of clearing to Dodd-Frank-mandated market
reforms, Congress directed financial regulators to establish rigorous
regulations that would ensure well-capitalized market participants'
eligibility for clearing membership, 14  thereby reducing market
concentration, and "mitigat[ing] conflicts of interest" in the operation of
DCOs.15  Congress was acutely aware of the over-concentration and
conflicts of interest-the "problem[s]"-that arise when "95 percent of
all of the clearinghouses in this country are owned by just five banks"
who, in turn limit competition for clearing services in order to boost
their profits." To eliminate this problem, Congress provided regulators
with broad authority to adopt less restrictive participant membership
criteria for DCOs" and "strong conflict of interest rules on control ...
of clearing and trading facilities.""
Dodd-Frank includes specific provisions that prohibit DCOs from
imposing arbitrary and excessive capital requirements on clearing
members and that help ensure that DCO policies and procedures are not
carries social benefits. Principally, it reallocates credit risks to an entity . . . whose
dedicated role it is to manage those risks in a robust and transparent manner.").
12. See Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,736.
13. See Letter from Senators Christopher Dodd and Blanche Lincoln, supra note 3.
14. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 11 1-203, 72 5 (c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1687 (2010).
15. Id § 726(b), 124 Stat. at 1695. See id § 726(c) ( "[T]he Commodity Futures
Trading Commission shall "consider any conflicts of interest arising from the amount
of equity owned by a single investor . . . and the governance arrangements of any
derivatives clearing organization that clears swaps .... "); 156 CoNG. REC. H5217
(daily ed. June 30, 2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2010-06-
30/pdf/CREC-2010-06-30.pdf (recording a colloquy between Representative Stephen
Lynch and Representative Barney Frank in which both Congressmen agreed that
sections 726 and 765 require the CFTC and the SEC "to conduct rulemakings to
eliminate the conflicts of interest arising from the control of clearing and trading
facilities by entities such as swap dealers and major swap participants").
16. 156 CONG. REC. H5217 (daily ed. June 30, 2010).
17. See Dodd-Frank Act § 72 5 (c), 124 Stat. at 1687.
18. 156 CONG REC. H5217 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Lynch)
(emphasis added).
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unduly influenced by the interests of large SDs. Section 725 of Dodd-
Frank directs the CFTC to promulgate rules that require DCOs to
establish "appropriate admission and continuing eligibility standards ...
for members of, and participants in . . . derivatives clearing
organization[s]" so as to ensure "fair and open access" to clearing
services.19 Additionally, section 726 of the statute directs the CFTC to
establish governance standards and limits on the ownership of voting
equity that would mitigate the "conflicts of interest" that encourage
large SDs/banks to clear trades bilaterally rather than-as Dodd-Frank
mandates-through clearinghouses. 0 Section 726 directs the CFTC to
limit the amount of equity a single investor may own in a DCO so that
large SDs cannot use their influence as DCO stakeholders to hamper
access to clearing membership. 1
II. SD-DOMINATED CLEARINGHOU SES HAVE PLACED PROFITS OVER
PRU BENT RISK-MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
Large SDs have to date dominated the clearing industry and, as a
consequence, have tended to oppose rules that establish reasonable
ownership limitations and governance standards for DCOs.22 As
Senator Sherrod Brown observed in his comments on the CFTC's
proposed conflicts of interest rules, "[t]he financial services industry is
arguing for a DCO membership regime that would favor the large dealer
19. Dodd-Frank Act § 725(c), 124 Stat. at 1688.
20. Id § 726(c), 124 Stat. at 1695; see also BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra
note 10, at 67 ("[T]he incentives of users to resist the expansion of central clearing ...
might lead to migration towards the CCP of products previously cleared bilaterally and
profitably for the CCP members themselves."); DerivAleit, Q&A With Hal Scott of
Harvard Law: Clearinghouse Ownership and Risk, TRADEWEB (Oct. 20, 2010),
http:/ '/xwww.tradeweb.com/Blog/Q-A-With-Hal-Scoti-of-Harvard-Law--Clearinghouse-
Ownership-and-Risk/.
21. See Dodd-Frank Act § 726, 124 Stat. at 1695.
22. See Satyajit Das, Central Counter Party Tranquilliser Solutions, NAKED
CAPITALISM (Nov. 3, 2011), http://'lwww.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/11 /satyajit-das-
central-counter-party-tranquilliser-solutions.html ("Predictably, large highly capitalised
banks favour higher capital requirements, ensuring their dominant position."); Dawn
Kopecki, U.S Derivatives Bill Bars Dealers From Owning Clearinghouses,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 16, 2009), littp:// www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=agLyUlOaqYuk (discussing the financial industry's
opposition to limits on the ownership of clearing facilities).
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banks who currently dominate the OTC derivatives market."23  When
Dodd-Frank passed, 90% of swaps were traded through the world's ten
largest banks; swaps trading generated approximately $60 billion in
revenue a year for these banks.24 As mentioned above, the five largest
commercial banks-JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup,
Goldman Sachs, and HSBC-accounted for approximately 96% of the
total banking industry's notional amounts and 85% of the industry's net
credit exposure in the derivatives market.25 These large banks-banks
that "control the trading of derivatives and all key elements of the
infrastructure of derivatives trading"2 6 -have resisted reforms that aim
to increase access to clearing and, subsequently, reduce the significant
profits that large banks generate from bilateral trading.
Because Dodd-Frank's clearing mandates will not apply to any
swap executed before the statute's regulations are implemented well into
2013, the big SDs continue to dominate swaps clearing and to limit
access to clearing in order to ensure that banks can still extract
extraordinary profits from OTC trading. For example, an overwhelming
number of clearing members of ICE Clear Europe are large banks, large
bank holding companies, or affiliates thereof.28 Such members include,
23. Comment Letter from Sen. Sherrod Brown to David A. Stawick, Sec'y,
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, and Elizabeth m. Murphy, Sec'y, Sec. Exch.
Comm'n (Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/
ViewComment.aspx?id=26486&SearchText=.
24. See Gretchen Morgenson, It's Not Over U, ntil It's in the Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 29, 2010, at BUI, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/29/business!
29gret.html?pagewanted I &ref-derivatives.
25. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC's QUARTERLY
REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES: SECOND QUARTER 2010
(2010).
26. ROBERT E. LITAN, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, THE DERIVATIVES DEALERS' CLUB
AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS REFORM: A GUIDE FOR POLICY MAKERS, CITIZENS AND
OTHER INTERESTEDPARTIES 3 (2010), available athttp://xvww.brookings.edu/~/
media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0407 derivatives litan/0407 derivatives litan.pdf.
27. See id.; see also ROUNDTABLE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 8, at 111 ("The
transaction fees and the spreads still make an unregulated market very, very profitable,
probably more profitable than the profits that would derive from clearing. So, if you
have the swaps dealers in control of a clearing facility, they have that incentive.").
28. See ICE Clear Europe Clearing Aembers, ICE (Dec. 13, 2012), available at
https://www.theice.com/publiedocs/clear europe/ICE Clear Europe Clearing Membe
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but are not limited to, the five large U.S. commercial banks mentioned
in the previous paragraph, Barclays Bank, BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse
International, and Deutsche Bank.2'9 These same large financial entities
constitute the vast majority of the clearing members of ICE Trust, which
is a U.S. affiliate of ICE Clear Europe.30 Also, NYSE Euronext, which
runs the New York Stock Exchange and New York Portfolio Clearing, is
partnered with several large banks including Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley.' Thus, the concentration within the derivatives
clearing market remains high, and continues to raise "concerns about
anti-competitive pricing and conduct."32
Large banks have used their considerable influence as major
stakeholders in DCOs3 to keep smaller but highly credit-worthy
institutions out of the clearing market.3 As the CFTC has observed,
"enumerated entities have economic incentives to minimize the number
of swap contracts subject to mandatory clearing," and have used their
influence as DCO members to keep "swap contracts out of the
mandatory clearing requirement. Also, Gary deWaal, general counsel
at Newedge in New~i York, has argued that "[s]ome current capital
r List.pdf (listing the banks and bank holding companies (and their affiliates) as well as
other major financial entities that constitute ICE Clear Europe's members).
29. See id.
30. Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,732, 63,735 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010).
31. See Jonathan Spicer, US Lawmakers Urged to Drop Clearinghouse Ownership
Cap, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2009, 2:08 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009 11/20/
us-financial-clearing-limit-idUSTRE5AJ3ZM20091120.
32. Letter from Sen. Sherrod Brown, supra note 23; see Suzanne Miller,
Derivatives Risks Still Loom Large, THE DEAL MAGAZINE (Dec. 9, 2011, 12:00 PM),
http://'lwww.thedeal.com/magazine/ID/043305/featuires/derivatives-risks-still-loom-
large.php (reporting that "large clearing groups pose significant concentration risks in
the leading Western markets" and that "[c]oncentration risks loom as exchanges and
clearinghouses continue to consolidate").
33. See Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,734 (noting that because DCOs spread
their losses across their members members contribute substantial resources to a DCO
default or guarantee fund that is used to cover outstanding losses that result from a
member's default members exercise significant influence over how a DCO manages
risk).
34. See ROUNDTABLE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 8, at 26 (stating that banks have
been "really clever about keeping people out of the system").
35. Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,734.
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requirements [for DCO membership] are exclusionary."" Specifically,
DCOs have imposed capital requirements for clearinghouse membership
eligibility that far exceed the requirements needed for conservative risk
management. For example, in 2010. the same year that Congress passed
Dodd-Frank, ICE Trust required new members to contribute a minimum
of $1 billion of adjusted net capital to the general guaranty fund, and
required non-futures commercial merchants to have $5 billion of
tangible net worth in order to qualify for DCO membership." Thus,
SDs appear to have employed clearinghouse ownership as a tool to stifle
competition within the derivatives clearing market and, subsequently, to
force swaps users to pay the substantial fees banks charge for bilateral
clearing, and to use execution facilities controlled by these same SDs.
III. RESTRICTING THE CAPITAL REQUIREMENT FOR DCO MEMBERS
WILL FACILITATE GREATER ACCESS TO CLEARING AND MORE
DIVERSE OWNERSHIP OF DCOs
The CFTC's final participant eligibility rule establishes
requirements for DCO membership that promote swap traders and
investors' access to clearing." The final rule requires DCOs to adopt
objective, publicly disclosed, and risk-based admission and continuing
eligibility standards for DCO membership. 40 These standards must also
36. Matt Cameron, A Clash Over CCP Membership, Risi MAGAZINE (Feb. 3,
2011), http://vww,.risk.net/risk-magazine/feature/2015731 /clash-ccp-membership.
37. Comment Letter from Michael Greenberger, Professor, Univ. of Md. Sch. of
Law, to David A. Stawick, Sec'y, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Re: ICE Trust
U.S. LLC - Application for Registration as a Derivatives Clearing Organization
Pursuant to Section 5b of the Commodity Exchange Act and Part 39 of the Regulations
of the Commission 5 (Dec. 17, 2010), available at
http://xvww.michaelgreenberger.com/files/Greenberger CFTC ICE Trust Application
forDCO.pdf.
38. Thomas Peterffy, Chairman and CEO, Interactive Brokers Grp., Comments
Before the 2010 General Assembly of the World Federation of Exchanges, at 2 (Oct.
11, 2010), available at http://www.interactivebrokers.com/download/
worldFederationOfExchanges.pdf (blaming "short-sighted greed on the part of the
brokers" for restricting access to clearing markets).
39. Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. 69,334, 69,436 (Nov. 8, 2011).
40. Id
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represent the least restrictive means to achieve the DCO's objectives. 41
Significantly, the final rule prevents DCOs from setting a minimum
capital requirement of more than $50 million (i.e., a $50 million
threshold) for any institution seeking clearing membership. 42 Also, the
final rule requires DCOs to establish "capital requirements that are
based on objective, transparent, and commonly accepted standards that
appropriately match capital to risk."43
The SEC has proposed similar participant eligibility and risk-
management requirements to those found in the CFTC's final rule.44
The SEC's proposed rule would require DCOs to "provide a person that
maintains net capital equal to or greater than $50 million with the ability
to obtain membership at the clearing agency."45 It would also require
DCOs to "establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies
and procedures" for risk management purposes.6
A. ESTABLISHING A $50 MILLION THRESHOLD FOR DCO MEMBERSHIP
PROMISES To ENSURE GREATER STABILITY AND COMPETITION WITHIN
THE DERIVATIVES CLEARING MARKET
The $50 million threshold will allow smaller but strong, financial
entities that could not satisfy the excessive membership requirements
imposed by large SDs to become DCO members and compete to provide
clearing services to individual traders and investors. 4  As CFTC
41. Id
42. Id at 69,437. See Comment Letter from Professor, Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law,
to David A. Stawick, Sec'y, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Re: Financial
Resources Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations (Dec. 13, 2010),
available athttp://michaelgreenberger.com/files/Greenberger DCO Financial
Resources.pdf.
43. Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. at 69,437.
44. Clearing Agency Standards for Operation and Governance, Exchange Act
Release No. 64,017, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,472 (proposed Mar. 16, 2011).
45. Id at 14,538.
46. Id
47. Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. at 69,355-56 (observing that lowered capital
requirements will increase the number of firms clearing swaps). See Letter from CME
Grp. to the Secretariat of the Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Re: Consultative
Document: Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector, at 11 (Apr. 16, 2010)
[hereinafter Letter from CME Group], available at http://www bis.org/publ/bcbsl65/
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Chairman Gary Gensler observed, the CFTC's final capital requirement
for DCO membership "promotes more inclusiveness ... [and] improves
competition that will benefit end-users of swaps, while protecting
DCOs' ability to manage risk."48 Similarly, the Department of Justice
has long maintained that "strict" minimum requirements for DCO
membership would "limit the possibility of anticompetitive conduct" by
SDs in the derivatives clearing market.49 The Department of Justice has
also claimed that such strict requirements would create "competitive
benefits" for market participants, such as lower costs of clearing
transactions for swaps traders and improved market liquidity by helping
to ensure that DCOs cooperate with SEFs and DCMs to facilitate
exchange trading.so
The financial industry has argued that the increase in DCO
membership, facilitated by lowered capital requirements, will increase
risk in derivatives clearing. Large SDs insist that current capital
"requirements are [now] set at prudent levels to ensure the safety of the
clearing house[s]" and dismiss claims that such requirements are
"exclusionarv" or based on unsound risk management principles.5 For
example, Christopher Edmonds, president of ICE Trust in New York,
asserted that "[c]apital requirements are part of the safety net in a default
scenario, together with other factors such as margin and the default
fund."5 Similarly, Bill Hill, of Morgan Stanley, insisted that unless
DCOs "have clearing members who have enough capital . . . to
recapitalize the clearinghouse if a member defaults . .. [and] to keep the
cmegroup.pdf (reporting that in 2009 CME processed and cleared approximately 2.6
billion contracts with an estimated notional value of $813 trillion).
48. Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Statements of
Support by Chairman Gary Gensler: Position Limits (Oct. 18, 2011), available at
http://vww.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/genslerstatementl01811 b.
49. Comment Letter from the Dep't of Justice to the Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, at 2 (Dec. 28, 2010), available at http://vww.justice.gov/atr/public/
comments/265618.htm.
50. Id. at 3 ("Dealers might use their control over a DCO to resist the move to
exchange trading by declining to clear contracts that are well-suited to central clearing
but that the CFTC has not yet required to be centrally cleared.").
51. Cameron, supra note 36 (quoting an anonymous US dealer who asserted that
"[4t]he chatter about requirements being exclusionary and labelling current members a
cabal is just rubbish").
52. Id
2013]
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clearinghouse flat from an economic risk perspective . . . you actually
increase risk in the clearinghouse because at a time when a member is
defaulting, the clearinghouse won't be able to absorb the losses.
Thus, large SDs have consistently argued that they are uniquely
qualified, by virtue of their vast financial resources, to insure against
risk in the derivatives clearing market.
The systemic failure of the banking industry during the 2008
financial crisis undermines by inference the argument that large SDs are
best situated to guarantee stability within the derivatives clearing
market. Large SDs proved incapable of stemming the financial crisis,
and relied on almost $13 trillion of taxpayer bailouts and guarantees to
remain in business." Further, the five major commercial U.S. banks
that dominate the derivatives market were some of the first financial
institutions to receive funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP)." The crisis exposed the vulnerabilities of individual SDs-
namely their collective inability to diversify risk by means other than
relying on taxpayer subsidieS56 -and suggests that restricting DCO
membership to large SDs jeopardizes, rather than improves market
stability.
In contrast to current swaps clearing membership practices, the
CFTC's $50 million cap for market participants satisfies Congress's
directive that DCOs have "sufficient financial resources . . . to meet
their obligations." Expanding DCO ownership will decrease the
magnitude of any membership default by distributing the costs of default
across a greater number of members. It will also decrease "the high
degree of market concentration" within the derivatives market, as this
concentration "still has the potential to result in the nullification of tens
53. ROUNDTABLE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 8, at 18-19.
54. The True Cost of the Bank Bailout, PBS (Sept. 3, 2010, 8:25 AM), available at
http://',www.pbs.org/xWnet/need-to-know/,economy/the-true-cost-of-the-bank-bailouit/
3309/.
55. MILLER, supra note 11, at Summary.
56. Id at 2 ("Before 2007, such firms were generally viewed as too well diversified
or too well managed to fail. In 2008, their vulnerability was shown to be greater than
previously assumed, and the question of their long-term creditworthiness now depends
in part on whether the government would again intervene to ensure that their contracts
are honored during a future crisis.").
57. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 725(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1688 (2010).
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of billions of dollars worth of contracts."" As Newedge's Gary deWaal
observed: "[m]embership needs to be opened up-clearing works when
there is a large buffer of intermediaries dispersing the risk. If the risk is
spread between too few entities, it is too close to bilateralism. You need
to have different groups of clearing members, which lessens the
correlation in the clearinghouse."59 In this respect, prudent risk
management strategies require that DCO members have adequate capital
resources, and that members are sufficiently numerous so that risk is
spread across a diverse array of financial organizations.
Further, history demonstrates that broad-based risk management
strategies that offer membership to a large number of financially stable
institutions foster long-term stability for markets and market
participants. For example, the CME Group, which operates one of the
largest clearinghouses in the world and has over sixty members,60 has
not defaulted on an obligation to a clearing member (or had a clearing
member default on an obligation to CME) during its 110-plus year
history.61 The historical stability of diverse clearinghouses supports the
CFTC's conclusion that the $50 million threshold "will not significantly
increase risk or lead to admission of clearing members who are unable
to meaningfully and responsibly participate in the clearing process."6 2
In fact, the final threshold for DCO membership will likely reduce risk
for clearing members by including a diverse number of institutions that
go beyond the "Too Big to Fail" banks that caused the 2008 financial
crisis.
Moreover, the CFTC's final rule on clearinghouse core principles,
which includes the CFTC's final participant eligibility rule, requires
DCOs to establish minimum risk management standards to mitigate the
risk posed by member default.6' The CFTC requires DCOs to direct
58. MILLER, supra note 11, at Summary.
59. Cameron, supra note 36.
60. See Clearing Firms, CME GROUP, http://vww.cmnegroup.comn/tools-
information/clearing-firms.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2012).
61. Letter from CME Group, supra note 47, at 11.
62. Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. 69,334, 69,355 (Nov. 8, 2011).
63. Id. (noting that some commentators argued that the proposed capital
requirements "should not increase risk to a DCO because a DCO can mitigate risk by,
among other things, imposing position limits, stricter margin requirements, or stricter
default deposit requirements on lesser capitalized clearing members").
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their members to post margin and authorizes DCOs to implement "other
risk control mechanisms" that "limit . . . exposure to potential losses
from defaults by clearing members."6 4 DCOs must collect margin that is
commensurate with the particular risks associated with an individual
clearing member's portfolio or product and reassess a member's level of
risk on a regular basis.65 Additionally, a DCO must ensure that clearing
members "have access to sufficient financial resources to meet
obligations" to the DCO under "extreme but plausible market
conditions."" The regular and detailed review of DCO members' risk
exposure required by the CFTC's final risk management rule further
safeguards DCOs from the possibility of customer default, even as
DCOs experience a significant increase in membership.
Finally, lowering the capital threshold for DCO ownership best
ensures that the profits that will result from Dodd-Frank's mandatory
clearing requirement will be distributed across a wide-spectrum of
participants within the derivatives clearing market. Dodd-Frank's
clearing requirement will radically increase the volume of clearing swap
trades and "result in trillions of dollars in derivatives transactions
moving from the OTC dealer market into a clearing environment.67
The CFTC's $50 million threshold will prevent SDs from having
exclusive access to substantial profits generated by mandatory clearing
that will increase the capital reserves of market participants as a whole.
B. INCREASING/CIRCUMVENTING MINIMUM CAPITAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR DCO MEMBERSHIP
The CFTC clearly intends DCOs to honor the $50 million threshold
for DCO membership. However, the limited exceptions to the $50
million threshold, as well as the operational requirements included in the
final participant eligibility rule, may be viewed as a loophole that will
64. Id at 69,418. See also BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 10, at 66
("[M]argins often constitute an important part of the CCP's protection against default . .
65. Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. at 69,417 18.
66. Id at 69,437.
67. MILLER, supra note 11, at 4; see also Kopecki, supra note 22 (quoting
Congressman Barney Frank as saying that Dodd-Frank will "driv[e] a lot of business to
the exchanges").
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allow DCOs to impose higher capital requirements for clearing
members.
As previously mentioned, the final rule authorizes DCOs to exceed
the $50 million threshold in order to "set forth capital requirements ...
that appropriately match capital to risk."" It also authorizes DCOs to
use participant capital to ensure that clearing members meet their
obligations to the DCO.69 Additionally, the final rule directs DCOs to
"require clearing members to have adequate operational capacity" to
meet their obligations to the DCO. Such requirements include, but are
not limited to the member's ability to: process expected volumes and
values of cleared transactions within a specified time frame; fulfill
collateral, payment, and delivery obligations to the DCO; and participate
in default management activities."
The CFTC clearly does not intend for DCOs to establish member
capital requirements that exceed the $50 million threshold. The final
rule requires that a DCO not "enact[] some additional financial
requirement that effectively renders the $50 million threshold
meaningless for some potential clearing members." The CFTC
maintains that any such additional financial requirement would violate
the final rule's prerequisite that a DCO "not adopt restrictive clearing
member standards if less restrictive requirements that achieve the same
objective and that would not materially increase risk to the derivatives
clearing organization or clearing members could be adopted."*3 The
final rule's ban on needlessly restrictive requirements applies to a
DCO's operational capacity and member eligibility requirements."
Additionally, as previously noted, the final rule requires DCOs to base
member capital requirements "on objective, transparent, and commonly
accepted" risk management standards, so that DCOs cannot impose
arbitrary restrictions on their members.
68. Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. at 69,437.
69. Id
70. Id
71. Id
72. Id at 69,356.
73. Id at 69,436.
74. Id at 69,355-56.
75. Id at 69,437.
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Despite the fact that the CFTC prohibits DCOs from imposing
financial requirements that render the $50 million threshold
meaningless, the limited discretion that the final rule allows in relation
to capital and operational requirements have been mistakenly and
worrisomely read to allow DCOs to circumvent requirements that are
designed to increase DCO membership. For example, CFTC
Commissioner O'Malia observed in his dissent to the final rule: "[tjhe
final rulemaking recognizes that DCOs may increase capital
requirements for legitimate, risk-reducing reasons," but "provides little
insight on how the Commission intends to differentiate between (i) a
required risk-based increase in capital requirements and (ii) an
illegitimate attempt to circumvent the $50 million threshold to squash
competition.""' Further, he dismissed the CFTC's requirement that
DCOs adopt less restrictive alternatives as too "vague" to provide "legal
certainty or bright lines for DCOs and potential clearing members to
follow."77 Again, these remarks are part of a dissent to passage of the
final rule and should not be viewed as conclusively interpretive by the
CFTC.
Unfortunately, however, the industry may try to exploit any
ambiguity in the rule. As a senior industry representative recently
observed, "the debate is going to centre" on the exceptions to the $50
million threshold since the "rule essentially gives DCOs . . . the ability
to impose extra capital requirements, if they can prove it contributes to
prudent risk management."7 In this respect, the final rule may provide a
loophole for DCOs by allowing them to "appropriately match capital to
risk."?9
76. Scott D. O'Malia, Comm'r, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Statement
of Dissent, Final Rulemaking On Derivatives Clearing Organizations (Oct. 18, 2011),
available at http://xlwww.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
SpeechesTestimony/omaliastatementO1181 1b.
77. Id In 2011, ICE Clear Credit reduced its minimum capital requirement for
clearing members to $100 million, but introduced a requirement that its members hold
excess net capital equal to 5% of their segregated customer funds. Id. The change
prompted two FCMs to complain that ICE's net capital requirements violated fair and
open access requirements, and led O'Malia to conclude that the CFTC's "final
rulemaking gives very little guidance on the criteria that the Commission will apply in
adjudicating a dispute . . . ." Id
78. Cameron, supra note 36.
79. Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. at 69,437.
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The minimal operational capacity requirements established by the
final rule may provide DCOs with an additional opportunity to restrict
clearing membership." For example, CME has identified operational
capacity as an "important hurdle" to DCO membership and insists that
"[p]rospective clearing members must be able to provide evidence they
have the requisite expertise to perform the duties required of a clearing
member,"" including the capability to price and manage large
derivatives portfolios. To this end, DCOs like CME have suggested that
members should operate an internal trading desk to ensure that they
provide DCOs with accurate pricing information,82 a requirement that
FCMs like Jefferies and Newedge have argued is totally unnecessary
and constitutes "just another artificial barrier to keep the largest
independent firms out."R8
The kinds of further protections proposed by the CFTC are
critically important because of these contrivances.
IV. RIGOROUS GOVERNANCE STANDARDS AND LIMITATIONS ON
OWNERSHIP INTERESTS FOR DCOs WILL HELP TO ENSURE
FREE AND OPEN ACCESS TO CLEARING
The CFTC and the SEC have proposed rules to mitigate the
conflicts of interest that Congress determined threaten to exclude
financial institutions from various swaps clearing memberships.8 4 Like
the CFTC's final rule on participant eligibility, the CFTC's proposed
conflicts of interest standards for DCOs, SEFs, and DCMs ("designated
entities") promote access to clearing and exchange trading by curbing
SDs' ability to restrict the membership in a designated entity." The
shared aims of the CFTC's final rule on participant eligibility and the
80. Cameron, supra note 36.
81. Id
82. Id
83. Id
84. See Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,732, 63,733 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010).
See also Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based
Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National
Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC,
Exchange Act Release No. 63,107, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,882 (proposed Oct. 26, 2010).
85. See Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,733.
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CFTC's proposed conflicts-of-interest rule risk creating overlapping and
perhaps even redundant regulation. Despite this fact, the CFTC should
finalize rigorous governance standards for DCOs that eliminate conflicts
of interest in derivatives clearing" in order to safeguard the protections
promised by the CFTC's final $50 million cap on capital requirements
for DCO membership.
Although this section focuses on the CFTC's proposed governance
rules for DCOs, the issues discussed below also pertain to the CFTC's
proposed rules regarding the governance of SEFs and DCMs, and to the
SEC's proposed governance rules for designated entities. Many of the
elements that comprise the CFTC's proposed governance standards for
DCOs also comprise the CFTC's proposed governance rules for
designated entities generally. For example, the CFTC's proposed rules
require DCOs, SEFs, and DCMs to establish nominating committees
and disciplinary panels" and have the same percentage of public
directors (35%)-directors who have no material relationship with a
clearinghouse or its members"-on their Boards of Directors.8
86. See Huw Jones, Clearing House Ownership Not a Risk Issue - Report,
INVESTING.COM (Nov. 10, 2010, 12:13 PM), htip:/xxwww.forexpros.com/news/central-
banks/clearing-house-ownership-not-a-risk-issue--report-173337 ("Clearing houses
will play a key role in determining which derivatives and other products can be cleared
and regulators say stakeholders like banks may be tempted to pursue their own financial
interests to the detriment of risk management."); BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra
note 10, at 57 ("[I]n determining whether or not to have trades cleared ... market
participants may consider only the private benefits they obtain from doing so. They
may not consider the positive effects central clearing may have for third parties or the
economy at large."); Matthew Leising, Derivatives Clearinghouse-Oinership Limits
Are Dropped ftom U.S. Bank Bill. BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2010, 1:44 PM),
http:// www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-25/derivatives-clearinghouse-ownership-
limits-are-dropped-from-u-s-bank-bill.html ("The limit was meant to reduce bank
conflicts of interest over their control of clearinghouses and how they could block over-
the-counter derivatives from being processed because they benefit from keeping the
trades private.").
87. See Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,733.
88. Id. at 63,747 (proposing a bright-line definition of "public director"). The
proposed definition expressly excludes the following persons: a DCO officer or
employee; a director, officer, or employee of a DCO member; an officer of an entity
that has a compensation committee (or equivalent body) upon which an officer from the
DCO serves; a partner, officer, or employee of an entity that receives over $100,000 in
combined annual payments for legal, accounting, or consulting services from the DCO;
or a committee director who accepts a contingent, conditioned, or revocable consulting,
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Similarly, many of the same elements appear in the CFTC and the
SEC's proposed conflicts rules (e.g., proposing the same individual and
aggregate limits on ownership of voting equity)."' Consequently,
despite its narrow focus, the following analysis raises many issues that
are relevant to the conflicts of interest that threaten the clearing of both
exchange-traded swaps and exchange-traded security-based swaps.
A. THE CFTC's PROPOSED GOVERNANCE STANDARDS AIM To ENSURE
FAIR AND OPEN ACCESS TO CLEARING
The CFTC's proposed conflicts of interest rule aims to "improve
the governance of certain DCOs"9 1 by increasing the number of public
directors who comprise a DCO's Board, as well as its governing
committees.9 Accordingly, the proposed rule requires that a DCO's
Board of Directors be comprised of at least 35% public directors, 3 no
fewer than two public directors, and at least 10% DCO customers or
customer representatives."' The proposed rule also requires DCOs to
establish nominating committees that must be comprised of at least 510%
public directors95 and at least one disciplinary panel that comprises at
least one public director, who also must chair the committee.96
Additionally, the CFTC's proposed governance standards require a
DCO to create a risk management committee that is comprised of at
advisory, or other compensatory fee (other than deferred compensation) from the DCO,
its affiliates, members, or affiliates of members. Id This proposed definition also
excludes immediate family members of the aforementioned persons from qualifying as
public directors. Id
89. Id at 63,738.
90. See Press Release, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, SEC Proposes Rules to Mitigate
Conflicts of Interest Involving Security-Based Swaps (Oct. 13, 2010), available at
http://vww.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-190.htm.
91. Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,733.
92. Id at 63,751-52.
93. Id at 63,738.
94. Governance Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated
Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities; Additional Requirements Regarding
the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 76 Fed. Reg. 722, 729 (proposed Jan. 6, 2011).
95. Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,752.
96. Id
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least 35% public directors and 10% DCO's customers or customer
representatives.97
Further, the CFTC's proposed conflicts of interest rule includes
limits on the ownership of voting equity that are designed to enhance the
proposed governance rules by limiting the influence that large
shareholders may exert over a DCO's Board and its committees. 8 The
proposed rule establishes two alternative limits on the ownership of
voting equity and the exercise of voting power within a DCO. Under
the first alternative, an individual member may not own or vote (directly
or indirectly) an interest that exceeds 20% of any class of voting equity
in the DCO.99 In addition, enumerated entities,o regardless of whether
they are DCO members, may not collectively own or vote (directly or
indirectly) an interest that exceeds 40% of any class of voting equity in a
DCO."' Under the second alternative, no DCO member or enumerated
entity, regardless of whether that member or entity is a DCO member,
may own or vote (directly or indirectly) an interest that exceeds 5% of
the voting power of any class of voting equity in a DCO.11
B. THE CFTC SHOULD ADOPT RIGOROUs GOVERNANCE STANDARDS
THAT SAFEGUARD THE PROTECTIONS OFFERED BY THE CFTC'S FINAL
RULE ON PARTICIPANT ELIGIBILITY
The CFTC's proposed conflicts of interest rule promises to curb
SDs' ability to manipulate DCOs' policies and procedures and,
subsequently, to restrict access to clearing. However, the CFTC's final
conflicts of interest rule must expand the protections offered in the
proposed rule if the rule is to ensure fair and open access to clearing.
97. Id at 63,740.
98. See id. at 63,738 (noting the importance of independent decision-makers for
designated entities).
99. Id at 63,733.
100. Id at 63,750 (defining "enumerated entities" as: (1) bank holding companies
with at least $50 billion in total consolidated assets; (2) nonbank financial companies
"supervised by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System"; (3) an affiliate
of (1) or (2); (4) a swap dealer; (5) a major swap participant; or (6) an "associated
person of' (4) or (5)).
101. Id at 63,733.
102. Id
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1. The CFTC Must Increase the Proposed Minimum Percentages for
Public Directors to Ensure DCOs Remain Independent of the
Competitive and Commercial Concerns ofDCO Avembers
The CFTC's final governance standards should increase the
required percentage of public directors for a DCO's Board of Directors
from 35% to 50% and mandate that at least 35% of a DCO's
disciplinary panel comprise of public directors. Increasing the minimum
percentage of public directors who serve on a DCO's Board from 35%
to 50% is consistent with the CFTC's original proposed standard for the
Boards of DCMs.1 1o In its original proposal for DCMs, the CFTC
argued that "the fifty percent minimum standard strikes a favorable
balance between inside expertise and 'outside' impartiality" and ensures
that other exchange stakeholders are adequately represented."10 4 The
CFTC also argued that requiring Boards to comprise of at least 50%
"public" directors would align DCM governance with other corporate
practices."o These arguments are no less applicable to DCOs, which
have "unprecedented influence over the manner in which a swap
contract can be executed.""o" Additionally, requiring DCO disciplinary
panels to comprise of at least 35% of public directors is consistent with
the standards proposed for risk management committees and would
ensure the "independent perspective" of DCO disciplinary committees
far more effectively than the single-public-director standard established
in the proposed rules.' 0
Contrary to arguments made by the financial services industry,
increasing the number of public directors on DCO Boards and governing
committees would not destabilize DCO governance. Goldman Sachs
and Deutsche Bank have argued that persons who are not associated
with a large financial institutions lack the "critical swap-market
expertise" necessary to effectively manage a DCO.'0o DCO directors
must have sufficient expertise in financial services, risk management,
103. See Conflicts of Interest in Self-Regulation and Self-Regulatory Organizations,
71 Fed. Reg. 38,740, 38,744 (proposed July 7, 2006).
104. Id at 38,746.
105. Id
106. Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,732, 63,734 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010).
107. Id at 63,737.
108. MILLER, supra note 11, at 8.
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and clearing services; however, this expertise is not exclusive to persons
who work for large SDs. The witness lists for hearings related to the
Dodd-Frank Act,109 the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 10 and the
many roundtables sponsored by the CFTC Dodd-Frank-related
hearings. reveal a vast number of academics, former regulators, and
other former and current market participants who are qualified to serve
as public directorsll2 on DCO Boards and committees.' 1
2. The CFTC Must Impose Aggregate Limits on the Economic Interests
That Enumerated Entities May Hold in a DCO
As shown below, when finalized, only the proposed 20% individual
and 40% aggregate limitations on the ownership of DCO voting equity
promise to reduce SDs' influence over DCO decision-making.
However, the final rule must also apply the proposed limits on voting
equity to the economic interest that enumerated entities may hold in a
DCO if the final rule is to safeguard access to clearing.
The proposed 40% aggregate limitation on the ownership of DCO
voting equity by enumerated entities would prevent SDs from holding a
majority stake in a DCO's voting interest and using that stake to restrict
access to DCO clearing facilities. As the Department of Justice
observed in its comments on the proposed rule, the lack of "an aggregate
ownership cap on major derivatives dealers" would "preserv[e] the
opportunity for these powerful entities to achieve majority ownership"
109. See Regulatory Restructuring and Reform of the Financial System: Hearing
Before the H. Fin. Serv. Comm., 110th Cong. 111 (2008), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-1 10hhrg46591/pdflCHRG-1 10hhrg46591.pdf;
see also Hearing to Review the Role of Credit Derivatives in the U.S. Economy:
Hearing Befbre the H. Ag Comm. 110th Cong. 111 (2008), available at
http://agriculture.house.gov/sites/republicans.agriculture.house.gov/files/testimony/110/
110-49.pdf.
110. Media Advisory, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission Announces Full Witness List for First Public Hearing, (Jan. 10, 2010),
available at http: //fcic-static.law. stanford.edu/cdn media/feic-news/2010-0110-
WitnessList.pdf.
111. See ROUNDTABLE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 8, at 2-5.
112. For the requirements of a Public Director, see Core Principles and Other
Requirements for Designated Contract Markets, 77 Fed. Reg. 36612, 36720 21 (June
19, 2012).
113. See MILLER, supra note 11, at 8.
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of clearinghouses and exchange facilities and would "not sufficiently
protect and promote the competition in the industry."...
In contrast, the alternative 5% limit on voting equity ownership
without an aggregate limit would do little to limit large banks' overall
influence over DCO decision-making if the CFTC's $50 million cap on
capital requirements for DCO membership fails to diversify DCO
ownership. The 5% limit on the ownership of voting equity would
allow "a mere eleven dealers to dominate the clearinghouse, control a
majority of its members, and dictate decisions of the organization"
without having to own a significant stake in a DOC's voting equity.1
For example, ICE Trust LLC-a major over-the-counter CDS
clearinghouse that has been criticized for preventing competitors from
becoming DCO members-is controlled by a number of major banks,
including Goldman Sachs, Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan, Credit Suisse
Group AG, and Bank of America Corp.1 6 None of these large banks
appear to own more than a 5% interest in ICE Trust; consequently, they
could band together using their combined 55% ownership stake to
dictate ICE Trust's policies and procedures.
Furthermore, the final rule must apply the 20% individual and 40%
aggregate limits to the economic interests that enumerated entities may
hold in a DCO. Although the financial industry has argued that "a
shareholder would have direct influence over a DCO . . . only if the
shareholder has the ability to exercise voting rights," economic
stakeholders can also assert indirect influence over DCOs.'7 As
114. Comment Letter from the Dep't of Justice to the Commodity Futures Trading
Comnm'n, supra note 49, at 2.
115. Comment Letter from Rep. Stephen F. Lynch to Gary Gensler, Chairman,
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n (Oct. 18, 2010), available at
http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicCommnents/NiewComnmnent.aspx?id=26291 &SearchText.
116. Comment Letter from Michael Greenberger, Professor, Univ. of Md. Sch. of
Law, to David Stawick, Secy, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Re:
Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets,
and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, at 3
(Nov. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Comment Letter, Re: Requirements for Derivatives
Clearing Organizations], available at http://michaelgreenberger.com/files/Greenberger
OwnershipCapComnmentLetter.pdf.
117. Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,732, 63,742 n.77 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010)
(noting disagreement among commentators regarding whether "a shareholder would
have direct influence over a DCO, DCM, or SEF Board of Directors only if the
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Heather Slavkin of the AFL-CIO observed during the Roundtable on
Governance and Conflict of Interest in the Clearing and Listing of
Swaps, "I think most of us can imagine a situation where someone owns
five percent of our company and asks us to do something. I don't think
it matters if that person gets to vote for the board of directors, that
person has real influence regardless of whether it's formal influence ...
.1 1 Additionally, if the CFTC does not limit enumerated entities'
economic interests in DCOs, DCOs will likely create special entities that
have no equity voting interests-i.e., limited partnerships-but exert
influence over a DCO's decision-making processes. 119 Thus, in order to
reduce SDs' influence over DCOs, the final rule must limit the amount
of economic interest as well as voting equity that enumerated entities
may hold.
CONCLUSION
The CFTC's final rule on participant eligibility and its proposed
rule on conflicts of interest for DCOs promise to ensure fair and open
access to clearing services. The $50 million threshold established by the
CFTC for DCO membership will increase the number of persons who
qualify for DCO membership and so reduce concentration in the
derivatives clearing market. The diversification of DCO ownership
facilitated by the final rule will, in turn, improve competition for
clearing services and increase stability within the derivatives markets by
ensuring that risk is distributed across a broad and diverse base of
financial entities. The CFTC should also adopt rigorous conflicts of
interest rules-rules that include an aggregate limit on the amount of
economic interest that an enumerated entity may hold in a DCO-in
order to safeguard open access to clearing facilities and reinforce the
$50 million threshold, as it would encourage DCO membership
diversification.
shareholder has the ability to exercise voting rights with respect to, e.g., election,
compensation, or removal of directors").
118. ROUNDTABLE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 8, at 153.
119. See Comment Letter, Re: Requirements for Derivatives Clearing
Organizations, supra note 116, at 5.
